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**ACTIONS AND OPTIONS IN THE BOSNIAN CONFLICT: A
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS AND A STRATEGIC APPROACH
TOWARDS CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

by

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
ABSTRACT

TITLE: Actions and Options in the Bosnian Conflict:
A Strategic Analysis, and a Strategic Approach
Towards Conflict Resolution

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Despite its duration, intense violence, and constant media attention, the conflict in Bosnia remains a bewildering mystery to most Americans. This essay serves three purposes. First, in combination with its Appendix, it provides important historical and political background information required to properly analyze the Bosnian debacle. Second, it traces the Bosnian policy trail of two Administrations and analyzes the strategic framework the U.S. and its Allies have applied. Further, the essay explores important questions on whether, when, and how the U.S. should use military force (emphasizing airpower) to resolve the Bosnian conflict. Finally, the author offers a strategic approach towards conflict resolution and illuminates those elements and opportunities that hold the most promise for a favorable outcome in the future.

Former Yugoslavia



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I. INTRODUCTION

Ramstein Air Base, Germany, May 1993: After a tumultuous day, Lt Col Canyon, the F-16 Squadron Commander was reflecting on what the squadron had just accomplished and what lay ahead. On extremely short notice, his F-16 squadron was tasked to replace USAF F-15s in place at Aviano Air Base, Italy. The F-16s' arrival would introduce a credible airstrike capability to air operations currently taking place over Bosnia. President Clinton appeared keen on airstrikes; Secretary of State Christopher was in Brussels seeking consensus from the European allies. The squadron would deploy the next morning. Colonel Canyon had called a meeting for the entire squadron and their spouses. He thought back on the speech he had heard some 18 months earlier when, as a line pilot, his previous stateside squadron deployed to Desert Shield. Everyone had understood that mission and those objectives. They knew that the Gulf War would be important. Now he was the leader. It was his turn to take the stage, explain the situation, and motivate the troops who were ready to serve. The only problem was, that in regard to the Bosnian situation, he "didn't have a clue."

Since the breakup of the former Yugoslav republic and outbreak of a particularly bloody civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there have been over 200,000 violent deaths and over two million displaced persons and refugees.¹ Yet, for most Americans, this conflict remains a bewildering mystery. Two minute sound bites on the major networks bring the violence of this conflict into our homes, at times quite dramatically, as in the case of the 5 February 1994 mortar attack in a Sarajevo marketplace. But, the media has had difficulty explaining the detailed causes for the conflict, and more importantly, why a solution or resolution to this conflict is so evasive.

The purpose and organizational structure of this paper is threefold. First, because the analysis presented requires a thorough understanding of the background to the conflict, the Appendix provides a "primer" on the former Yugoslavia and Bosnian crisis.² The causes of the conflict are complex. A basic explanation of pertinent historical background information, key demographics, and identification of the major actors is vital to understand the situation. The body of the paper begins with a brief strategic overview, then traces the policy actions and options that have been used since the outbreak of civil war up through April 1994 (the date written).

The Bosnian crisis remains a dynamic situation and any definitive assessment of the situation runs the risk of being overcome by events.

Next, this paper will undertake a strategic analysis of the Bosnian conflict by raising and addressing a number of important fundamental questions. Derived from a variety of sources, these are questions that strategists, senior decision-makers, and their advisors must ask before undertaking actions which might lead to a major commitment of resources, employment of airpower, deployment of U.S. forces, or even war.³ Emphasis will be placed on airpower and especially on airstrikes--a contentious element of power which has been the subject of considerable discussion both in the US and abroad. The discussion in this section will underscore the difficulty and complexity of the Balkans crisis and will highlight the most important considerations.

In the final chapter, the essay closes by identifying key instruments of international diplomacy and national and coalition power that produce the most leverage. Furthermore, this essay will offer a strategic approach that promotes conflict resolution. The prospects for a lasting peace in Bosnia are not bright, and even the most optimistic analysis is hopeful at best. Nonetheless, this paper will illuminate those strategic elements and opportunities which hold the most promise for a favorable outcome in the future.

II. STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

Concurrent with the outbreak of the war in the Balkans, the formal National Security Strategy of the United States called for "a strategy of engagement and leadership" in which we would seek (to list three key tenets):⁴

- o Global and regional stability which encourages peaceful change and progress
- o Open, democratic and representative political systems worldwide
- o An enduring global faith in America -- that it can and will lead in a collective response to the world's crises.

Clearly, if these lofty goals are to serve more than rhetorical purposes, then we need not go much further to argue the case for US action in Bosnia. To hypothetically state the case:

As the sole remaining superpower in the new unipolar world, the US must fulfill its leadership role and remain engaged in the world's most serious problems. It is incumbent upon the US to lead a collective response, drawing primarily from the Western Alliance and NATO, and solve the Bosnian crisis. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the former Yugoslav republics are struggling to emerge as representative democratic nations. This bloody civil war, by its example, is threatening the stability of the entire region, especially the new nations from the former Soviet Union. This crisis must be resolved if we are to transition successfully into the "New World Order."⁵

Such action complements two of the pillars of the National Military Strategy: Forward Presence and Crisis Response.⁶ Forward deployed forces demonstrate US commitment, lend credibility to alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis-response capability when required.⁷

Fifteen months into the Clinton administration, the national security establishment anxiously awaits strategy updates. The Bottom Up Review (BUR) likely foreshadows the new strategic framework. Three of four dangers cited in the Bottom Up Review are clearly present in the former Yugoslavia:⁸

- o Regional conflict, especially those caused by ethnic and religious animosity and acts of aggression
- o Challenges to democracy and reform, especially in Eastern Europe
- o Economic dangers--to national security if we fail to build a strong, competitive, and growing economy

Whatever national strategies emerge from the Clinton Administration will strive to counter these dangers and encourage US leadership, engagement, and action to safeguard our future and promote a more stable world. Only the economic dimension can be credibly used to argue against US action. Intervention in Bosnia may be extraordinarily expensive. Estimating the costs of intervention and determining the proper level of U.S. involvement in resolving this debacle requires as much prophetic vision as it does scholarly analysis.

With the strategic framework addressed, let us now turn to the policy trail and strategic foundation of two U.S. Administrations in the Balkans.

III. US POLICY AND INITIATIVES

"... this administration's most difficult problem ..."

President William Clinton

"Our failure to intervene .. is outrageous. It's genocide."

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan

"There are no circumstance--none--under which the United States should put ground forces in the Balkans."

Representative Newt Gingrich

"Europe has ultimate responsibility for what is happening in Bosnia, but they haven't done 'diddly'."

Senator Patrick J. Leahy

"Caesar didn't have a solution and neither do I."

Senator John Glenn

"This is a definable, doable mission."

Former Sec-State George Shultz

"... a government problem with no, totally no, good options."

Sec-Defense Les Aspin

"... the problem from hell ..."

Sec-State Warren Christopher

The crisis in the Balkans was, ironically, a success story for the US intelligence community. The world was warned as early as Fall 1990 that Yugoslavia would break apart within 18 months and that civil war was highly likely.⁹ However, the international community failed to arrest this crisis in the making. President George Bush had his hands full with many far more pressing problems: the break-up of the Soviet Union, economic problems on the homefront, and ultimately, the war in the Persian Gulf. After the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the European Community wanted to exert itself by taking the lead in the Balkan Crisis, which they did. However, the path they laid out ultimately led to disaster.¹⁰ The Bush Administration yielded to the EC, deferred action, and supported initial EC and subsequent EC-UN Vance-Owen initiatives to work out a diplomatic solution to this problem.

Vance-Owen Plan. As a result of many months of UN and EC sponsored negotiations among the Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslims, Serbs and Croats, Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen, joined by representatives from all warring parties, produced a plan which called for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into 10

largely autonomous provinces which would be loosely governed by a weak, Muslim dominated, central government. The Muslims and Croats initially approved the plan, but in the absence of strong U.S. support and Serbian refusal to concede territory, the talks and agreements eventually broke down. To its credit, Vance-Owen provided useful dialogue and made progress in working towards political solutions to many problems. A more detailed discussion of Vance-Owen is provided in the Appendix.¹¹

In sum, during the Bush administration, US actions were limited to humanitarian and airlift support for UN operations into the region, and very limited support to finding diplomatic and political solutions to the problem. Overall, Bosnia was viewed as a European problem best handled by the Europeans. Candidate Clinton adroitly recognized the public relations shortcomings of Bush's Bosnia policy and promised a more active role. Clinton stated he would examine new options, including airpower, to stop the blood bath.

Once in power, the Clinton Administration seriously examined the Bosnian problem and developed policy and strategy options. It quickly became clear that Bosnia presented a most difficult political and military problem--one in which consensus could not be achieved. Furthermore, the success of Serbian aggression compounded the problem. Many believe the Serbs had already accomplished a *fait accompli*. Three U.S. State Department members resigned during the two administrations, citing policy problems over Bosnia as the reason. Internationally, two UN peacekeeping commanders also quit in frustration. Both US Presidents have been subjected to numerous scathing criticisms over a failure in leadership, policy and strategy in handling this situation.¹²

Is this criticism valid or unfair? To pursue such judgment, let us now examine the Bosnian policy trail.

CLINTON BOSNIAN POLICY INITIATIVES AND PRINCIPLES

The Clinton Administration has worked within the international community, based upon shared responsibilities and common purpose, to achieve three primary goals:

- o Stop the killing in Bosnia
- o Prevent the conflict from spreading
- o Bring concerted pressure on all parties, especially the Bosnian Serbs, to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict.¹³

The US government and Administration has supported a number of actions and initiatives designed to further the prospects of achieving peace in the Balkans region. They are rarely outlined in a single integrated plan, but it is quite useful to do so. Listing them as an integrated scheme paints a clearer picture of the evolution of U.S. policy toward the Balkans. The major efforts, in approximate chronological order (amplified with parenthetical comments when appropriate) are as follow:

- (1) Support the maintenance and sanctity of internationally recognized political borders (i.e., support the boundaries of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina).¹⁴
- (2) Withhold formal diplomatic recognition of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro) in an effort to stem their support to warring Bosnian Serbs and stop their direct aggression in the Balkans.
- (3) Rigorously enforce the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro to isolate and pressure the regime. (Implemented)
- (4) Increase humanitarian support efforts in the region. (Implemented: this would lead to very successful airdrops to isolated Muslim enclaves).
- (5) Support and enforce the UN sponsored "no-fly" zone over Bosnia (US and Allied fighter aircraft -- Operation DENY FLIGHT).
- (6) Study and assess the full range of airpower options. (Ongoing)
- (7) Assess, but withhold a firm commitment of support to the EC-UN sponsored Vance-Owen plan.
- (8) Stiffen UN embargo/ blockade actions against all belligerents in the region. (Implemented)

(9) Contain the Conflict. Recognize the danger and stop the spread of ethnic wars into other regions. (This eventually led to the deployment of a 300 man US Contingent to nearby Macedonia as a signal of the US commitment).

(10) Publicly condemn the offensiveness of "Ethnic Cleansing" and fully support UN and International efforts to investigate and bring war criminals to trial.

(11) Support the establishment of the War Crimes Tribunal, so that those guilty of atrocities can be brought to justice.

(12)* Work within the international community to find mechanisms to resolve emerging conflicts in the post cold war era.

(13)* Increase support of the Vance-Owen peace plan, (a policy reversal) to include a pledge of deploying up to 25,000 US soldiers to safeguard the peace once all parties agree to the accord and adhere to a cease fire. (Support for this plan was eventually dropped and replaced by new Washington led diplomatic and political efforts, but the commitment to deploy peace-keepers [subject to Congressional approval] remains in effect).¹⁵

(14)* Lift arms embargo restrictions on Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁶
(This has not been implemented).

(15)* Take action in Bosnia only as a part of a wider coalition of nations, most significantly, NATO and the European Allies.
(This was a retrenchment and President Clinton went on record as saying, "I do not think we should act alone, unilaterally.")¹⁷

(16)* Authorize and conduct limited airstrikes in Bosnia-Herzegovina to destroy Bosnian Serb heavy artillery and mechanized forces and to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate a political solution to their dispute.¹⁸

(Rejected in May 93, revisited Feb 94, discussed later in detail)

(17) Establish Moslem safe-haven enclaves in Bosnia-Herzegovina and protect them with air-power if necessary.
(Approved but not enforced militarily. Exception: Sarajevo, following 5 Feb 94 marketplace mortar attack. Under further discussion)

(18) Sponsor Washington talks to achieve Bosnian-Croatian truce and formation of loose economic and political confederation.
(Implemented, Feb-Mar 94 with initial success).

Viewed as a "laundry list," there have been a surprisingly large number of actions taken. But do they represent an ad hoc approach or an integrated strategy? The section that follows analyzes these actions and shows how a strategy for Bosnia begins to unfold.

IV. AMPLIFICATION AND DISCUSSION: A STRATEGY UNFOLDS

AVIANO AB, ITALY, 25 DECEMBER 1993. Lt Col Canyon had just completed a benign flight over the Bosnian skies, in which heavy clouds prevented him from even seeing the ground below. As he stepped down from the ladder, he didn't notice the fire truck or crew van pull up, and was totally surprised when the rambunctious pilots hosed him down. He had just completed his 100th "combat sortie." He had never given his combat sortie count much thought. Aside from the first few DESERT STORM missions, everything else--PROVIDE COMFORT and DENY FLIGHT, had all been "milk runs." Instead of jubilation, the milestone seemed insignificant. His thoughts turned toward his family, far away this Christmas day. His squadron had been deployed over 50 per cent of the past two years, and they were tired of the long deployments and family separations. Reflecting back on the truly uneventful flight just completed, he wondered if they were accomplishing anything worthwhile, or were they "just boring holes in the sky."

When the actions and options are assembled and reviewed in a single document as done in the preceding section, a Clinton Strategy for Bosnia begins to take shape. Essentially, this strategy calls for a series of political, diplomatic, economic, and limited military measures. As we view it today, the first step, (only recently realized) is to obtain a truce between the Bosnians (Moslem majority) and Croats (both within Bosnia and Croatia). Next, coerce the Bosnian Serbs (viewed as the principal belligerent) to cease their war fighting and come to the peace table. Once a cease-fire is achieved, then deploy the troops (approximately 50,000, including up to 25,000 Americans) (akin to UNPROFOR in Croatia) for peace-keeping operations.¹⁹ Thus far, these measures have not been sufficient to motivate the Serbs to cease hostilities.

These measures have not been issued as an integrated package, but have followed a trickle-down approach over some 15 months. The US population's and accordingly, the Clinton Administration's interest in Bosnia ebbs and flows. There has been clear support for humanitarian efforts throughout the conflict and the Administration has been fairly consistent in using diplomatic and political efforts to promote the foreign policy goal of obtaining regional stability. However, when considering actions that introduce military options and operations other than war, the Administration has displayed a panoply of confused tactics in a weak effort to force a resolution.

Not surprisingly, the trend has been to undertake Bosnia initiatives largely in response to public sentiment--to what can be called, the "CNN factor."

The first major emphasis on Bosnia occurred around May of 1993--the so called "bomb and lift" plan. This initiative was comprised of points numbered 13-16 above (marked with an asterisk[*]). The Administration launched a major campaign to obtain public, congressional, and allied support. The initiative was highly contentious and received mixed domestic support. Next, Secretary of State Warren Christopher traveled to Europe to "sell" this plan. It was rejected by the EC and resulted in the Administration's first major foreign policy setback. Instead, a European proposal for Bosnian Moslem "Safe Haven" enclaves (point number 17) was proposed and accepted by the US administration. However, it was not backed up by force and was hampered by a complicated approval process to bring airpower to bear. Should a "Safe Haven" site need assistance, the UN would first need to be on scene, then the on scene commander would request airstrike authority through the EC and NATO, who in turn would take it to the UN. Neither Europe nor America supported a military escalation in Bosnia in the summer of 1993. In the first significant reading of America's pulse, military action in Bosnia was not in the "national interest."

After this setback, Bosnia was deliberately removed from the President's "in-box" in a public relations "damage control" move. Accordingly, the crisis also dropped off the "front page" and the U.S. turned its attention to more pressing domestic issues, such as health care, crime, and Whitewater.²⁰

Between June and September 1993, attention to the Bosnia situation waned.²¹ In September-October of 1993, a deteriorating situation in Somalia, which included US combat fatalities, further reduced America's desire to get involved with Bosnia. As winter set in, not surprisingly, the Serbs became more bold and quietly, but effectively, increased their siege warfare. Media

attention slowly returned to the region, but it was not until the 5 February 1994 Sarajevo mortar massacre took place, with 68 dead civilians, that CNN and America again focused on the Balkans. The U.S. Administration again pressed for the airstrike option, and this time the EC and UN agreed. An ultimatum was issued to the Bosnian Serbs to remove their weapons from Sarajevo (beyond 20 kilometers) by 21 Feb 94 or face the consequences.

Russia, which in the past presented a roadblock to tough action against the Serbs, reluctantly acquiesced to the use of airstrikes, and warned its fellow Slavs that this time the coalition meant business. The Serbs pulled their heavy weapons back from Sarajevo, averting air strikes, and the Russians scored a diplomatic coup.

Remarkably, the Bosnian Serb air force chose this unusual time to test NATO credibility by conducting their own airstrikes against a Bosnian munitions factory.²² On 28 February, four NATO (US F-16) aircraft responded to this "no-fly zone" violation (and hostile act of aggression) and shot down four of the six offending aircraft. This marked NATO's first use of armed force in its 44 year history. Although the US Administration played down the significance of the dogfight, a new element of power was introduced to the conflict--the threshold was raised.²³

A final key element of the series of significant events in February-March 1994 was the heralding of a Muslim-Croat peace accord (point 18 above). During elaborately choreographed ceremonies in March, President Clinton, Secretary of State Christopher, the prime ministers and political leaders of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina signed accords to create a confederation of religious and ethnically based provinces (or "Cantons") in the Muslim and Croat regions. The Cantons will exercise authority over traditional municipal responsibilities (police, education, housing, culture, etc.). Both cultures are guaranteed

equal protection under the law, and the central government will be responsible for foreign affairs, national defense, and commerce. A more ambitious goal of the agreement is to create an economically and politically independent state, and avoid a three way partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina along ethnic lines.²⁴

In the aftermath of these events, the Administration again signaled a shift in public statements about Bosnia. In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Christopher said that the United States had important strategic, political, and humanitarian interests in bringing peace to Bosnia. Such a strong articulation will be vital to prepare the public for the possible deployment of American troops.²⁵

This review of the Administration's Bosnia policy raises a number of questions. Does the long list of measures cited above constitute a coherent strategy? Will the measures serve to motivate the Serbs to come to the peace table? Will the first air engagements of the war ease the transition to an increased level of warfare? Does NATO need to up the ante by conducting airstrikes? Should the threat of airstrikes be used in support of additional "safe havens" such as Tuzla? And most importantly, is it time to deploy additional forces for peace-enforcement vice peace-keeping operations? It appears likely that it is only a matter of time before (U.S.) airstrikes occur. But before undertaking even greater measures, such as air power and/or peace-enforcement options, a serious strategic assessment is required.

V. STRATEGIC ANALYSIS: EXPLORING KEY QUESTIONS

The Air War College resources-objective model defines strategy as "a broad concept, embracing an objective, resources, and a plan for using those resources to achieve the objective."²⁶ There are a number of questions to be raised in exploring desired policy and strategy options. At the core of this study is the underlying question on when and how force ought to be used to resolve this conflict. The first shots by US/NATO forces have been fired. Should there be a next step, a further escalation, or is retrenchment in order? As the US stands on the potential threshold of applying military options, two key military components are being considered: airpower and troop deployments.

Airpower has already been widely applied to the conflict. Air superiority was quickly established through Operation DENY FLIGHT, support operations have been in effect for considerable time (airlift, aeromedical, airdrops), reconnaissance missions are routine, and for lack of a better term, "multi-purpose combat air patrol" (armed F-16s, AC-130s, F/A-18s) fly overhead daily. A number of increased thresholds for airpower employment can easily be envisioned. Five escalatory scenarios readily come to mind, the first of which already occurred when Bosnian aircraft were shot down by NATO air superiority patrol aircraft. Potential expanded airpower options (in increasing order of escalation and commitment) are:

- 1) Aerial engagements (shoot down of no-fly violators)
- 2) Close air support attacks against targets should UN peace-keepers become endangered and request and receive such support
- 3) Airstrikes against offending artillery/mortar sites in "safe havens" such as Sarajevo or other designated sites
- 4) Air support operations in support of peace-enforcement operations (both Close Air Support and Force Application), and
- 5) Air campaign (to include interdiction and possibly strategic attack)

The mechanisms for the first three applications already exist, and can easily be triggered through an incident, an alteration of Rules of Engagement (ROE), or a conscious, albeit, relatively minor, policy decision. As such, they are likely to occur.²⁷ The latter two airpower options require significant policy decisions and are on the threshold of war. For simplicity purposes, in the discussion which follows, distinctions between the options cited above will not be made and will merely be referred to as increased airpower options.

As for land forces, approximately 15,000 non-American peacekeepers are in the Balkans, with only a handful of US troops: 15 in Bosnia, 300 in Macedonia, and a handful elsewhere.²⁸ If a ceasefire can be brokered and peace arranged, approximately 50,000 troops are estimated to be required, with up to 25,000 Americans. If a more ambitious undertaking--"peace-enforcement" is envisioned, considerably more assets will be required.²⁹ Troop estimates range from 100,000 up to 400,000. The likelihood of the grand scale peace-enforcement operations is low, and therefore, in the analysis that follows, a "reasonable" number of 25,000 US and 50,000 troops is used as a level of commitment.

Let us now examine the questions vital in determining if it is appropriate for the US to increase its application of airpower or deploy substantial troops to Bosnia. As a starting point:

WHAT'S THIS CONFLICT TRULY ALL ABOUT? WHAT ARE THE OBJECTIVES?

Renowned military strategist Carl Von Clausewitz's explanation of belligerents' motives applies equally well today as it did over a century ago:

War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.
War is .. but .. a political intercourse, carried on with other means.³⁰

The principal objective of the individual Balkan Republics was to satisfy their long standing (and suppressed) nationalistic desires for autonomy from a centralized state, and to effect a government ruled by the dominant ethnic

majority. The intensity of these ethnic feelings, which runs counter to the "melting pot" multi-ethnic, egalitarian heritage of America, is difficult to comprehend, but most assuredly exists. For illustrative purposes, consider the words of Radovan Karadzich, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, on his people's historic task: (selected extracts)

Exposed to the anti-cultural pressure of the soulless West, we wrestle with our long-lost identity and strive to fulfill the challenge which the West demands we forgo. If .. extinguished, we should be exposed to the advances of the aggressive Islamic East ... Our struggle is against the primordial danger from the Islamic octopus which employs smart new clothing, but remains constant in its irreconcilability against the Serbian orthodox essence ... the Serbs no longer wish to be a part of an amorphous Bosnian mass ... Serbia is a wonder of the world, the model for lands and nations ... Our goal is unification with Serbia.³¹

Let us now quickly examine the view points and objectives of the nation-states involved in the conflict.

Bosnia-Herzegovina. This ethnically diverse republic is trying to establish itself as a nation. Envisaged as a democratic confederation of three ethnically based cantons within its borders (Moslems, Serbs, and Croats), the election of a Muslim leader (due to the Muslim's slight population majority), Alija Izetbegovic as the head of the collective republic presidency, met with resistance from the Croats, and violent rebellion and secession by the Serbs. The Muslim majority favor a larger role and greater power for the federal leadership than either of the other groups. In short, the Bosnians are fighting for their survival as a nation.

Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This faction would much prefer to look toward Belgrade for its leadership, but recognizing the improbability of this, are the strongest supporters of cantonization. Unwilling to be ruled by a Muslim president, Bosnian Serbs went to war. They have seized control of 70-80 per cent of the republic and employ a ruthless strategy of "ethnic cleansing" characterized by massacres of thousands, gang rapes of Muslim women, and expulsion of non-Serbs from their homes. The results have been thousands of refugees, and over time, a shift in the population composition within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their goal: Serbian rule for Serbian people, autonomy, or union with a greater Serbia.

Serbia and Montenegro. The role of the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is less clear. Its powerful and ruthless leader, Slobodan Milosevic is believed to be the mastermind behind the Bosnian Serbs' strategy, and desires a united Serbian led "Yugoslavia." If left unimpeded, Milosevic's Yugoslav Republic may very well achieve this objective over time. Although he is a shrewd and clever politician, Milosevic's influence over Bosnian Serbs is in dispute. (Milosevic claims he holds little control; the West believe he is extremely influential). Serbian goals: hegemony in the region, protection for all Serbs in the Balkan region, and ultimately, a Serbian homeland for the Serbian people.

Other Former Yugoslav Republics. Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia all clearly want nation-state status and security from hostile action by Serbia (the dominant threat) or any other potentially hostile neighbors. Montenegro, Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Sandzak, to varying degrees seek greater autonomy from their Serbian ruler. Their objectives: autonomy, security, viability as nation-states.³²

This discussion explains the goals of the region's principal actors, but,

WHAT DO THE WORLD'S OTHER NATIONS THINK? (THEIR OBJECTIVES?)

Western Europe. The Western European Community (EC) wanted to demonstrate a united front and display its leadership role in the new world order; they were given the chance. The reality of the situation is that nearly every European nation has its own unique hidden agenda with respect to the outcome in the former Yugoslavia. The UK, France, Germany, and Austria have historical, cultural, ethnic, or security concerns and ties to the Balkans. Austria and Germany encouraged Slovenia's and Croatia's movement toward Western Europe, but are indifferent to Bosnia and others. Britain, France and much of Scandinavia stake out the moral high ground and seek a fair and just resolution to the conflict.

Southern and Eastern Europe. Similarly, Greece, Italy, Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Rumania share the EC's concerns, plus either border or are in close proximity to the Balkans. Greece is fearful of an emerging Macedonia. Turkey is concerned about its Moslem brethren. Other eastern European states, such as Albania, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary are concerned for their fellow countrymen subjected to oppressive ethnic-oriented regimes. Furthermore, all fear of spillover and are concerned about sovereignty. Many oppose "outsiders" (such as the US) coming in to solve "their" problems. In sum, taking Europe as a whole, consensus on almost any Balkan issue is almost impossible.

The World of Islam. The potential for a second Muslim nation in the European continent is of major concern to the world's Islamic nations. They view with disdain the west's reluctance to resolve this problem and see it in large part as a religious as well as ethnic problem. Both western Europe and the US risk losing some of the advantage gained from the Gulf War against Iraq.

Russia. Russia has a history of close ties to the Slavic Serbs and also views the rise and independence of ethnic nationalist enclaves with concern. They see themselves as important stake holders in resolving the conflict. The former Soviet Union clearly influenced the Balkans. Politically, the conflict presents Russia with both internal and external leadership issues. Their prestige is on the line. The potential for unfavorable modeling for the former Soviet republics is high, and, the Serbs are increasingly turning to them for help. In the words of one Serb:

The Russians are our natural allies. We are the same Slavic nation, Orthodox people who understand one another and can get along.³³

The Rest of the World. The discussion above covers the major world actors with clear interests in the region, but assuredly, the rest of the world is watching this closely. The conflict is prominent in the United Nations' agenda.³⁴ This leads nicely to the next question:

WHY IS THIS CONFLICT IMPORTANT?

"What's taking place there is worse than what Hitler did."

Senator Strom Thurmond

"Bosnia is the defining moment of the post-Cold War era. Absent a dramatic turnaround ..., we are in for very troubled and dangerous times."

Representative Frank McCloskey

"the Bosnian tragedy is destroying the self-confidence of the Western democracies [and] ... revealing a degree of moral decadence [that] is very dismaying and ominous"

Zbigniew Brzezinski

The quotes above powerfully communicate the importance of Bosnia. To address this question, here are the most compelling reasons:

- o The Balkans are located in a geostrategically important position, bridging Europe to Southwest Asia
- o Historically, events in the region have had significant, and in World War I, catastrophic results
- o It is an early major test of the Post Cold War order of nations
- o The conflict encompasses issues of democracy versus stability, ethnic-religious conflict, and reemergence of nationalism
- o Potential for spillover is high; Even more significant, it may provide an unwelcome model for other emerging nation-states
- o The Muslim world is watching carefully; it could fuel the rise of radical Islamic fundamentalism as a destabilizing influence elsewhere
- o Genocide, refugees, "ethnic cleansing," rape, hunger, ravages of war -- the legacy of man's inhumanity cries out for moral action
- o Bosnia provides a test, and is stressing the resiliency and solvency of NATO as both a political and military organization; it also can provide an opportunity to prove its relevancy in the new world order
- o As the world's only superpower in a unipolar world, the US will be assessed and judged on how it responds to this crisis

And so, with that overview of the belligerents and the world's concerns, an explanation of why the conflict is so important, and the eyes of the world looking towards the US, we now turn to the question:

IS IT IN THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST TO ACT IN BOSNIA?

Since the U.S. is unencumbered by the historical, ethnic, and cultural ties of many of the world's nations, and since America is thousands of miles away, the Balkans would appear to be outside the sphere of vital U.S. interests. Earlier in this paper, the link was demonstrated between elements of the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and why it would be consistent for the U.S. to take an active role in resolving the conflict in the Balkans. In the section immediately above, every reason why this conflict is important applies to US interests. But the *National Interest* is a bit tougher to precisely define. A favorable outcome and conflict resolution in the Balkans is clearly in our national interest; the implications in the aftermath of this conflict may be severe. But, what measures the United States should take is far less clear.

For President Clinton and the nation's leadership, the diplomatic, political, and economic measures employed to resolve the conflict are fairly easy to agree upon. It is merely a matter of how, and against whom to target such actions. But, when the problem evades solution using these "non-lethal" elements of national and international power, then, as Clausewitz noted, the use of military force (or war) becomes the means to continue policy.

Before increasing the use of air power or deploying troops, the important judgmental questions for the American people and our policy makers become:

- o Is the situation in Bosnia worth fighting for?

Which can and should be translated to the emotional question:

- o Is it worth sending our uniformed sons (and daughters) over there to die for?

and secondly,

- o Can we really help solve the Bosnian conflict by sending troops and launching airstrikes?
(Escalating the use of air power)

In the US, there are those who believe a role of the President (assisted and checked by Congress) is to assess, and at his discretion, influence the national interest.³⁵ In the summer of 1993, when President Clinton was specifically asked, "What rationale would there be for going to air strikes in Bosnia?", he as much admitted that he was not yet ready to articulate that criteria and responded:

If I decide ... to use air power, I would have a very specific, clearly defined strategy to pursue and very clear tactical objectives for the use of that air power, which would have a beginning, a middle, and an end ...³⁶

The President, his advisors, and Congress are carefully assessing this most important question of national interest. Lack of consensus contributes to the reluctance of the US to escalate its military involvement in the Bosnian debacle. Another important factor that delays or prevents action is in fact the military dimension of the problem, specifically:

Can we really help by sending troops and using airpower?
Can we do this effectively and achieve our objectives?
Or, will we merely contribute to the needless killing and level of violence?

Let us turn now to the military dimension and answer:

IS THE U.S. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY TAILORED TO MEET NATIONAL POLITICAL OBJECTIVES?

If the United States opts to increase its involvement, to many, airpower is an attractive option. The case for using air power stems principally from the unique characteristics of this resource. Consider the following simple strategy model:

The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is primarily a civil war. The US has formally recognized the Muslim led government and wants to assist them in halting the insurrection being waged by the Serbs and coerce the Serbs into recognizing this legitimate government. Airpower is readily available; it can be launched both from aircraft carriers and from Italian air bases. Air-strikes may be launched with low risk to the aircrews, a high probability of success during the initial wave against identifiable, fixed targets, and with little risk of undesirable collateral damage. Airstrikes can be used to "level the playing field" and improve the negotiating stature of the weakly armed central Muslim government.

Airstrikes fit nicely within the US framework of our national political objectives. Unfortunately, they may be of limited value in the long term in this particular conflict. In Bosnia, we must ask whether we face (again) the quagmire of entering an unwinnable war, using limited means, and fighting a limited war amidst a number of participants, who, from their perspective, are waging an especially violent, total war. The Bosnian Serbs are fighting an agrarian war, that is, they are seizing land. Following the initial strikes, the heavy weapons will likely disperse into the countryside, be hidden by camouflage, be sited in the midst of civilian population centers. Many weapons (mortars, RPGs, larger caliber machine guns, etc.) do not lend themselves to destruction by airstrikes because of their mobility. In this conflict, the heavily armed Serbs have enjoyed many advantages over the poorly armed Muslims. In sum, the Serbs may quickly reduce the utility and effectiveness of the air campaign. Should this occur, would the U.S. be prepared to take the logical next step and commit sizable numbers of ground combatants?

The question of deploying ground troops truly raises a core doctrinal issue for the US armed forces. Drawing heavily from the lessons of the Vietnam War, in November of 1984, then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger eloquently outlined six major tests that should be met on "when and how a great democracy" should use military force.³⁷ This doctrine was met and validated during the Persian Gulf War, refined under the leadership of General Colin Powell, and formally written into the national military strategy.³⁸ This strategy's key points call for clearly defined objectives, public support, and most importantly:

the ability to rapidly assemble the forces needed to win--the concept of applying decisive force to overwhelm our adversaries and thereby terminate conflicts swiftly with a minimum loss of life.

During Congressional testimony on the Bosnian war, Lt Gen Barry McCaffrey, then Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speculated that "ending the violence in Bosnia would take around 400,000 troops deployed for a year or so."³⁹ Critics of the Pentagon have been quick to point out the "Catch 22" shortcomings of the military's "all or nothing" approach. The Administration is being called to review the use of limited force for more limited political objectives, such as lifting the siege of Sarajevo. In the future, the military's doctrine of "decisive force" may be "hemmed in."

Much of the analysis presented thus far, especially that of the preceding question, have already overlapped with the next question:

WHAT ARE THE LIMITS OF MILITARY POWER?

Colonel Harry Summers, a noted military strategist and columnist, periodically points out that the American public views Air Power as a magic panacea that can solve any number of military problems.⁴⁰ Summers has aptly pointed out that in any given conflict, there are clearly limits on what airpower can achieve.

During testimony of professional airmen, there were no assurances that air power alone could easily solve the problem. Airpower's utility may prove to be limited. It can be used to assist the central Bosnian government and might even motivate the Bosnian Serbs to come to the conference table with more serious intent.⁴¹ Proponents of airpower, such as General Merrill McPeak, have stated that "we can attack artillery positions, interdict supplies, and take a variety of coercive actions which I think would have some impact on Serbian operations," but General McPeak was careful to point out that he was not sure if airstrikes would stop ethnic violence or keep it from spreading to other areas.⁴²

In other congressional testimony, Marine Corps General John Sheehan said US reconnaissance can:

locate only about a quarter of the Serbs' 600 artillery pieces. To destroy even those guns with some degree of predictability requires people on the ground.⁴³

General Mike Ryan, USAF, predicted that if the allies were to use "airstrikes alone," the Serbs would simply "ride it out."⁴⁴

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, there are also huge expectations on the part of the American public. But, there are tremendous differences between the Gulf War and the Bosnian conflict. In the Gulf War, the airpower campaign used a concept of parallel attack, attacking targets across the spectrum of warfare--strategic, operational, and tactical. The focus of much of the bombing was against Iraq's centers of gravity: Baghdad, the Republican Guard, the leadership and hubs of command and control. It was a target rich environment.⁴⁵

No such target set exists in the Balkans war. The Bosnian Muslims are dependent on open lines of communication (roads, airports, seaports). Sarajevo, an international city, is vitally important to all warring factions. But there are no readily identifiable centers of gravity for the other belligerents in Bosnia. To strike at the Serbs, and reach beyond the tactical level, one must look towards Belgrade, an extremely escalatory step riddled with road-blocks. Much as we would like, we cannot apply the success of the war with Iraq to Bosnia; there are too many differences.

As for the land battle, this paper has already addressed some of the problems peace-enforcement forces will face on the ground. This is a war about control of the land. The terrain is rugged and hostile. There are at least three warring factions, not including peace-keeping forces. To counter any faction, large numbers of troops would be required to fight, win, and hold territory. Fighting would be dynamic: both conventional and unconventional.

Outgunned, the Bosnian Muslims resorted to guerrilla warfare tactics, and forced the Serbs to use siege and urban warfare. If the Serbs are confronted with overwhelming conventional forces, they too will revert to unconventional tactics, withdraw into the population, and wait the storm out. The key limitations of US and NATO power would be resolve, the willingness to deploy sufficient troops, and patience.

Overall, in applying outside military power to resolve the conflict in Bosnia, it is likely that no use of military power, let alone air strikes, can solve difficult, complex, deeply-rooted internal problems of this magnitude. The objectives of the rival groups in Bosnia are deeply held; the terrible fighting has increased their hatred; and the Clausewitzian concept emphasizing the primacy of politics during war prevails. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the political problems of forming a government acceptable to three diverse ethnic groups is tremendously difficult. There are clearly limits to what military power, and especially airpower, can achieve. The entire situation hauntingly elicits visions of Vietnam, which leads nicely to the next question:

WHAT ARE THE LESSONS FROM THE PAST?

Does today's strategy challenge in Bosnia either overlook points of difference or exaggerate likeness between past conflicts? Almost all the experts quickly warn policy makers that the situation in Bosnia looks a lot more like Vietnam than the Gulf. The chart which follows highlights many of the key Bosnian areas that lend themselves to comparison:

COMPARISON CHART: VIETNAM WAR, GULF WAR (IRAQ) AND BOSNIA

Category/Subject	Vietnam	Iraq	Bosnia
Clear Objectives	No	Yes	No
Industrial Society/Military	No	Yes	No
Favorable Terrain/Geography	No	Yes	No
Support of People	No (later)	Yes	?
Unconventional Warfare	Yes	No	Yes
Civil War	Yes	No	Yes
Lack of Central Authority	Yes (S.V.)	No	Yes
Availability of Weapons	Yes	Yes	Yes
Communist Ideology	Yes	No	Recent
Partisan Warfare	Yes	No	WW II
Long History of Warfare	Yes	Yes	Yes

At a glance, we readily comprehend that the euphoria of our Desert Storm success quickly wears off as we note the Vietnam similarities. However, we must be cautious to not be hamstrung by exaggerating points of likeness. For one thing, our technology and tactics have caught up to our doctrine with respect to airpower employment. Hundreds of sorties were required (and many aircraft were lost) to drop a single span of the Paul Doumer Bridge in North Vietnam, but single F-15Es took out bridges with one 2,000 lb laser guided bomb during the war with Iraq.

As for land operations, the Vietnamese communist aggressors were a disciplined, highly motivated group, who, over time, won the hearts and minds of a homogeneous Vietnamese people. The Bosnian Serbs' strengths lies primarily in their inheritance of assets from the Yugoslav Peoples' Army and support from Serbia. Certainly, their conduct of the war, and their periodic set-backs when they encounter limited Muslim resistance, would indicate that they are clearly not a highly organized, disciplined, fighting force. While on the surface, a cursory examination of the factors above gives one pause, it should not rule out action. Moreover, the lessons of Vietnam and the Gulf War clearly mandate that before undertaking any military adventure in Bosnia, both the objectives and a coherent strategy need to be fully spelled out.

One lesson from both the Vietnam and Gulf wars that cannot be overlooked and is crucial to whatever options US leadership decides involves public opinion.

HOW STRONG IS THE HOMEFRONT?

When the crisis in the Balkans first unfolded, the American media and therefore, the public, paid it little attention. In the views of one British expert:

the US networks' coverage was sporadic, uninformed and usually downright wrong. For the majority of Americans, the daily fare of news included only a brief mention that some people with unpronounceable names were fighting others with equally bewildering appellations, in an area where, confusingly, 'Slavonians' abound.⁴⁶

Unlike the Gulf War, there is no oil, no infamous villain equivalent to Saddam Hussein, and no major Slovenian, Croatian, Serbian, or Bosnian ethnic group or lobby in the U.S. to educate the public or capture our interest.⁴⁷ Clearly, when you consider the challenges George Bush faced in "selling" the Gulf War, it will take an amazing feat by Bill Clinton to mobilize the homefront to fight for the republics from the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the recent violent, painful deaths of American soldiers in Somalia, complete with detainees in captivity and American corpses being dragged through the streets--and displayed on CNN--all serve to rekindle American isolationism, bad memories from Vietnam, and a tremendous reluctance on the part of the American public to get involved.

President Clinton was elected on a domestic agenda where he is comfortable with the subject and frequently in command of the issues and agenda. A consummate politician, sensitive to the American public, he may not be willing to lead America into action in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES?

The US and international actions outlined earlier covered the gauntlet: diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, naval blockade, *demarches*, political efforts, meetings, conferences, humanitarian assistance, military "presence",

and limited application of airpower. This comprehensive "wait and see" approach has nearly exhausted the alternatives. Other options are to:

- (1) Ignore it. Decide that the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict truly lies outside the U.S. vital interests, allow the warring parties to either (a) exhaust and wear themselves out, or (b) reach a military conclusion.
- (2) Defer to the Europeans. A variant on option 1 above, stress that this conflict has its origins within the European Community. It is truly a European conflict, with European interests, which requires a European solution. Continue the present level of support, but go no further.
- (3) Acknowledge the Serb victory and seek containment. With 80 per cent of the territory in their control, accept the *fait accompli* and concentrate on stopping similar conflicts elsewhere.
- (4) Leverage the options that work the best and hold the most promise; refine and pursue an integrated strategy.

In the final chapter of this paper, I will expand upon the last alternative and outline an approach that holds promise. But before proceeding:

WHAT HAVE I OVERLOOKED?⁴⁸

As one studies the current dilemma in Bosnia, one cannot help but be struck by a number of ironies and additional questions that beg to be asked. Foremost among these are:

- (1) Are we being consistent? How do we balance the desire to promote emerging democracies against regional stability. The two are at odds. Militarily, we support an embargo of arms to the entire region and deprive the Bosnian central government from gaining the means to provide for its national security. Then we counter the Serbian advantage by establishing air superiority over Bosnia. When the Serbs wage siege warfare, we counter this with humanitarian missions, but much of this aid finds its way to all sides. Are we feeding all sides so that they can continue to abandon their farms and fight the war? Of course not, but ironies are aplenty in this conflict.
- (2) What signal do we send to Islamic world? Although previously addressed, there is an important point here. In much of the Islamic world, the West's inaction in Bosnia appears to them as rank racism. They perceive that the Western Powers really do not want an Islamic led nation to exist in their midst. As a result, the West is content not only to stand by passively and allow them to be exterminated, but actively contributes to the Bosnian Muslim's demise by withholding armaments vitally needed to resist.⁴⁹

(3) What are U.S. capabilities? How capable is the U.S. in the new era of draw-downs and reduced European presence? If the U.S. were to act, how much more difficult will it be, in light of the drastic European troop reductions, force reductions, and budgetary constraints?

(4) What about issues of statehood & nation-building? Is a region the size and population of Maryland really a nation? And is it worth the deployment and employment of US forces to secure its sovereignty. To what extent should the U.S., the EC, or the UN act to build the institutions required to comprise a legitimate sovereign nation? Is Bosnia-Herzegovina really a legitimate nation? Should Serbia continue to be held out as a pariah nation not worthy of recognition as a legitimate power?

(5) What happens if we fail to act? Does this imply tacit approval of "ethnic cleansing? Will it set an undesired precedent? Will other nations misinterpret this as a sign of weakness? Will it ignite more conflict elsewhere? Are we failing to fulfill our leadership responsibilities?

(6) How much will intervention and action cost? Obviously, a lot. The Gulf War cost in excess of \$90 Billion. Equally important, who will pay for it?

(7) Isn't it already too late? Bosnian Serbs are in control of over 70 percent of the disputed territory and continue to increase their control. How can we turn back the clock and correct what has already been accomplished? Each day that goes by more deeply assures the Serbs victory.

One of the downfalls of analyzing the Bosnia situation is that frequently, one raises as many new questions as one resolves, and pessimism turns to conviction. In turning to the final chapter of this paper, let's look at some possible answers.

CH VI. A STRATEGIC APPROACH TOWARDS CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Aviano AB, Feb 28, 1994. Lt Col Canyon was seated behind the duty desk, serving as Ops Supervisor and F-16 Supervisor of Flying. The command post phone rang, and an excited voice told him, "Looks like some of your boys are getting some action. Can you get some more up ASAP?" Canyon quickly phoned maintenance, stepped the next two aircrew in line, then stood by. Ten minutes later, a call came in on VHF Secure with terrific news: "Wilbur" had shot down three and "Yogi" one adversary aircraft. Everyone at Aviano was exuberant. Maybe now, we were a step closer to ending this war.

After completing a strategic analysis of the situation facing the Balkans, we can see what a truly difficult problem this crisis poses, and can better understand why the conflict has continued for so long. Recognizing that the "best and the brightest" of the U.S. government are working hard to resolve the Bosnian problem, it would be naive to assume that the strategic framework presented is an all-inclusive, comprehensive solution. It is offered primarily as an academic exercise, to promote an exchange of ideas, and to provoke thoughtful debate. With that caveat, this essay will now outline the sequential steps and key options that appear to provide the greatest possible leverage toward promoting peace in the Balkans.

o Define the End Game Solution (the Desired Outcome) First.

How do we envision a stable former Yugoslavia? What will be the borders and the military balance? This step entails defining a "win-win" end-game solution that: cedes a portion of Croatia to the Serbs; creates a much smaller Muslim Bosnia, but one which is solvent and viable, (one that is much smaller than the original boundaries at secession, but much larger than the 20-30 per cent of the original territory that the struggling central government currently owns); and either grants a semi-autonomous Serbian province in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or allows them to be united with a greater Serbia. Finally, lay out an optimal end-game military balance that gives each of the three parties sufficient military capability to deter and defend its borders.

o The US Needs to Stand Up and Assume the Leadership Role.

The US initially deferred to the EC. This response failed. We can stand by until the warring parties exhaust themselves, the Serbs win, or we can take the leading role, step up to this moral dilemma, and earnestly attempt to solve this conflict. European cynics scoffed at the prospects of the March 94 Washington talks, but the Bosnian-Croat agreements which came out of it hold much promise.

o Construct and Define an Integrated Strategy.

Earlier, this paper listed numerous actions taken to resolve the Bosnian conflict. Much of what is being done is working. Continue to stay the course and use all the tools: Continue the diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian actions. Continue the military elements: maintain air superiority and continue peace-keeping operations. And, most importantly, continue to pursue political solutions. However, instead of a piecemeal, ad hoc approach, tie it all together in a sequential, integrated approach. Publish it in hard copy--a "Security Strategy for Resolving the Balkans Conflict," and then make sure everyone is on the "same sheet of music." Once a coherent strategy is clearly defined, (with guarded optimism), it might just work.

o Mobilize the International Community.

The world wants to solve this problem. The UN and EC are actively pursuing solutions. After deciding on the integrated strategy as suggested above and delineated herein, then "sell it" to the world community. Such an approach was taken in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and can be done again here.

o Share in the Costs.

A lesson gained from the Gulf War experience is that America cannot afford and should not have to fight or pay for this conflict alone. This is especially true in light of the priority afforded the important domestic agenda of the Administration. Islamic nations are concerned about the outcome and many are well positioned to assist. Wealthy Islamic states should be encourage to contribute to set up a viable Bosnian Muslim state. Japan and Germany, boxed out of a military role due to Constitutional limitations, are among the world's wealthiest nations. Use the resources from the wealthy nations to subsidize the "troops expense" of poorer nations that have the military manpower pool to field the large peace-keeping forces initially envisioned (Russia, Egypt, Turkey, to name a few candidates). Again, US leadership will be required to pursue such a course.

o Contain the Conflict.

As an absolute minimum, do all we can to ensure the conflict does not spread beyond the current three belligerents, and certainly, to countries outside the former Yugoslavia borders (Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania, etc.). The US contingent in Macedonia serves precisely this purpose and has served us well. It is a model which may have practical applications elsewhere as well. It is important for the US to articulate its rationale; make sure the world knows such deployments entail a commitment to act if future aggression unfolds. A firm, proactive U.S. policy is far better than the vacuum that existed at the start of the current Balkan War. It is in the U.S. interest to prevent the war from spreading.

o Sell the Program to the American People.

At present, Americans don't understand what's going on in Bosnia and why it is important. A recent NBC News Special with Tom Brokaw was a good start.⁵⁰ The President could do well to follow this or a similar presentation and present the US and international security strategy that can resolve this conflict. Again, the Gulf War example applies.

o Engagement and Partnership with Russia.

This approach holds several advantages. First of all, Russia possesses a special relationship with the Serbs. They enjoy both leverage and credibility with them. Second, it is in Russia's interest to act to resolve this conflict: to provide stability to the region; because of the implications of the former Soviet states; for prestige purposes and their heritage as a super power; and simply, to influence the outcome of events. The US should no longer feel threatened by Russia;⁵¹ the Balkans conflict provides an opportunity for "partnership towards peace."

o Prioritize and Resolve the Easier Conflicts First.

When you examine the Balkans conflict and dissect it into subsets, we see several conflicts, and some are easier than others. For starters, take *Serbia vs Slovenia*. Hostilities have ceased. Formalize the peace. It represents a good vehicle to work the political and diplomatic elements. Next, continue to refine the delicate *Bosnian-Croat* accords, which appear so promising as this paper is being written. Next, tackle the *Serbia-Croat* war. The fighting is less intense; Serbia has achieved a de facto annexation of territory. Compromise and concessions can formalize the peace. Leave *Bosnia-Herzegovina vs the Serbs* for last. Continue to apply the measures contained herein, learn from preceding peace accords, and choose and model on what works best.

o Level the Playing Field.

A contentious option, because it could backfire and intensify the violence, start by using a Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) approach. Decide and define the relative military balance and capabilities that should exist for each of the Balkans nation-states. So long as Serbia possesses military dominance, she has little reason to not use what works best. Don't open the flood gates, but allow for limited arms to go to Bosnia-Herzegovina. As an innovative approach, engage Russia to "sell the arms." Former Soviet equipment is common to the belligerents, and Russia, the most reluctant major power to arm the Bosnians, has an excess of military equipment and can use the revenues. A final, but controversial element of this option warrants separate addressal and follows.

o Increase the Use of Airpower.

Airpower is an area where the U.S. and its Allies possess tremendous strength. Discussed earlier in the paper, the Sarajevo "Safe Haven Exclusion Zone" model, backed by force could be applied in limited situations. There are useful, but finite tactical objectives that can be achieved through airpower. Force application can translate into credibility. However, caution is required to avoid undesired backlash, escalation, and endangerment to UN peacekeepers on the ground. When force is applied, the tactical situation should strongly favor the Allied Coalition at the time. We will need to be prepared for the worst case next step.

o Plan for the Worst Case.

Before commencing airstrikes, coalition forces should have a Rapid Reaction Force readily available to respond to contingencies, provide rapid reinforcement and support UN ground forces. Such a concept has been integral to Northern NATO units for years, and may even be drawn from the Baltic contingents. A full-fledged air campaign, (which one assumes has already been developed) should be ready and on the shelf. A proper mind set on the part of coalition forces requires being prepared for occasional set-backs, casualties, and potentially a long term outlook. Herein, the rapidity of the Gulf War and the incredibly low number of casualties works to the detriment in this arena.

o Offer Incentives to Serbs and Serbia.

Try the "Carrot and Stick" approach. To date, the emphasis has been almost entirely on the "Stick." There is ample opportunity to work with a motivated Serbia. There are a number of inducements to offer the Serbs: concede conquered territory (accede to reality), reduce/remove sanctions, provide economic assistance (or pledges thereto), even offer international recognition and remove Serbia from its current pariah status. These are the tools--but all must be heavily contingent on behavior. This approach has already proved to be very useful with the Croats and Bosnian Muslims.

o Define the Exit Criteria.

Again, the lessons of the Gulf War, and more recently in Somalia, reinforce the need to know how we will get out. The first step in this strategic approach was to define the end state. It is essential to define it early so that we can recognize when "victory" has been achieved. The exit strategy must also lay out the sequence of events and steps to take as we extract our forces from the conflict region. As "versus Iraq", residual air power "presence" goes a long way to deter provocative actions from a would be aggressor, and is far more palatable than the most troubling issue of American troops on the ground.

CH VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In summary, the bloody war in the Balkans, centered over Bosnia-Herzegovina, is deeply rooted in the thousand years of conflict which have dominated the region. This is a war fueled by deeply felt ethnic and religious hate. Nationalist tendencies, held in check by Tito and the Soviet's ominous influence, have now been unleashed. It is a vitally important conflict because of where and when it is taking place, and what it portends in the new international order of the Post Cold War.

For the United States, the Bosnian conflict represents a tremendous challenge, raises important issues of national interest, and presents difficult questions of when and how a great power should resort to the use of force. There is no easy solution, only difficult choices. But options, strategies, and opportunities do exist to bring this conflict closer to resolution. Underlying all the discussion is the moral argument: should we intervene in Bosnia because it is the *right thing to do*? For our nation's decision-makers, it will take great courage to act. But conversely, one must reflect on whether the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina represents a situation that cannot be solved by the application of force.

ENDNOTES FOR TEXT

(1)George J. Church, "This Time We Mean It," Time, February 21, 1994, pp 24-28. Casualty estimates vary widely and cannot be precisely determined. Due to the wide readership and generally balanced approach, I have selected Time as the source for this data.

(2)My emphasis on providing pertinent background information ties into the introductory scenario. Based on lengthy discussions with my fellow classmates at the Air War College, the hypothetical squadron commander is not alone in not understanding the current crisis in the Balkans.

(3)The questions posed for strategic analysis are derived from the Air War College curriculum, my original thoughts, and heavily from three sources (listed in priority):

Phillip A. Crowl, "The Strategist's Short Catechism: Six Questions Without Answers," The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, No. 20, 6 Oct 1977, pp. 1-14.

Caspar W. Weinberger, "Six Major Tests on the Use of Combat Forces," An address to the Washington Press Club, 28 Nov 84, as contained in Air Force Policy Letters for Commanders, Office of the Secretary of the Air force, Washington, D.C., 15 Dec 84.

Brent Scowcroft, An address to the Air War College Foundation, General George S. Brown Distinguished Lecture Series, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 25 Oct 93.

(4)The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, January 1993, p. 3.

(5)The term "New World Order" was coined by President George Bush and was used rhetorically in the aftermath of the collapse of the Iron Curtain and during the coalition's response to Iraq's aggression. I use here to refer to the post cold world environment of the 1990's.

(6)Colin L. Powell, National Military Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 1992, pp. 6-7.

(7)IBID.

(8)Les Aspin, The Bottom Up Review: Forces for a New Era, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, Sep 1, 1993, pp. 1-2.

(9)This was confirmed in an article by David Binder in the New York Times on November 15th, 1990 which disclosed the contents on a National Intelligence Estimate. Extracted from Walter Roberts,

"The Balkan Debacle Could Have Been Averted," Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, Apr-May 1993, p.7.

(10) This thesis is intelligently argued by Jonathan Eyal in his work, Europe and Yugoslavia: Lessons From a Failure, London: The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1993, pp 61-80.

(11) There are wide disparities in viewpoints concerning the Vance-Owen proposals. For a fairly objective, yet positive review of the plan, refer to Stephen J. Woehrel's Bosnia-Herzegovina Negotiations: The Vance Owen Plan, congressional Research Service, Washington DC: Library of Congress, April 14, 1993. for a scathing review, see Robert M. Hayden's article previously cited.

(12) One need only review the editorials of the major newspapers to verify this fact.

(13) Secretary Warren Christopher, "Announcement of the Joint Action Program on the Conflict in Bosnia," US Department of State Dispatch, May 24, 1993, pp. 368-370.

(14) US News and World Report, May 17, 1993, p.24.

(15) The Administration has also repeatedly emphasized that it would only deploy such a force with the consent and approval of Congress. Both President Clinton and Secretary of State Christopher have placed their credibility in a tenuous position by promising a sizeable US troop deployment if the conditions for a peace accord and stable cease-fire can be achieved. They may have signed up to promises they cannot keep.

(16) Woehrel, Vance-Owen Report, p. 22.

(17) "Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Agony of Indecision," Foreign Policy Bulletin, Volume 4, Number 1, July/August 1993, p. 4.

(18) IBID.

(19) Peace-keeping and Peace-enforcement options will only be briefly addressed in this paper. However, for an excellent analysis, refer to Donald M. Snow's "Peace-Keeping, Peace-Making, and Peace-Enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order," Carlyle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, February, 1993.

(20) IBID. p. 5.

(21) This is based on a review of newspapers and newsmagazines during that time period.

(22) It is unclear whether the Serbs were testing NATO or merely made a tactical mistake due to a lack of coordination and centralized control. In any event, it proved to be a miscalcula-

APPENDIX

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE BOSNIAN CONFLICT:

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL

MAPS

KEY EVENTS

THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLES ARMY

THE NEW BALKAN REPUBLICS

KEY FACTS AND FIGURES

THE VANCE-OWEN PLAN

APPENDIX

I. HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

The former Yugoslavia, and especially Bosnia-Herzegovina, has a long history of political, ethnic, and religious friction. The history of the Balkans area (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Turkey) is a tumultuous one with a thousand-year history of wars, revolutions, brutal conquests and subjugation, terrorism, anarchy, and empire-building. The region has at various times been part of the Roman, Venetian, Byzantine, Austro-Hungarian, French, Serb, Ottoman, and most recently, the communist block empires.¹

The region was settled primarily by Slavic inhabitants in the seventh century. Throughout the middle ages, the region was contested by various Christian sects, principally Roman Catholic Croats, Orthodox (Russian Orthodox) Serbs, and a third religious force of Bogomil Christians. The rise of the Ottoman Turks in the 15th century led to their conquest of Bosnia-Herzegovina and much of modern day Yugoslavia. The region served as a buffer state between the Central Europeans of the Austro-Hungarian empire, the Russians, and Ottoman Turks. During the 500 years of Ottoman rule, many of the Slavs, especially the Bogomil Christians living in Bosnia-Herzegovina, converted to Islam to protect themselves from political and religious pressure, but earned the enmity of the remaining groups that maintained their Christian heritage.

In the late 1800s, with the Ottoman empire in decline, there were massive revolts of the Christian peasants against their brutal Muslim overlords. Serbia and Montenegro, assisted by Russia, vigorously crushed the Ottoman army in 1878.

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But the other European Powers feared a disruption in the balance of power which resulted in Bosnia and Herzegovina being placed under the administration of the Austro-Hungarian empire at the Congress of Berlin the same year. This did not sit well with the neighboring republics, especially Serbia, and the competing European alliances, coupled with ethnic frictions in the region, combined to ignite the first World War following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. The region erupted as the first main battleground of this war.²

In the aftermath of the First World War, an artificial state, initially the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later renamed Yugoslavia (Land of the Southern Slavs) was formed, binding together the multi-ethnic regimes of Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and Montenegro. Initially an experiment in parliamentary democracy, by 1921, this gave way to a centralist, unitary administrative power under the leadership of King Alexander I of Serbia who centered his administration in Belgrade. Protests by minority states, especially the Croats, were brutally treated. The creation of Yugoslavia completed the historic mission of successive Serbian governments to unite all Serbs in one state and resulted in a multi-ethnic and multi-national state dominated by the Serbs.³ It was a union marked by conflict, however. Ethnic hatred, religious rivalry, language barriers, and cultural conflicts plagued Yugoslavia from its inception.

The map on the following page illustrates the Balkan Region's early borders.

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MAP 1: THE BALKAN REGION:

The Macedonian Question: 1908 Through the Second Balkan War of 1913



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Croatian extremism emerged; the *Ustashe* (Uprising) movement sought independence for Croatia and was behind the 1934 assassination of King Alexander. Serbo-Croat relations appeared to improve in the 1930's as Croatia received considerable autonomy, but in 1941, Yugoslavia was invaded by Germany and its allies and rapidly fell. The Croatian *Ustashe* closed ranks with the Nazis and formed a brutal puppet government. The *Ustashe* forced conversions of Orthodox Serbs to Roman Catholicism and massacred hundreds of thousands of Serbs, as well as Jews and Gypsies.

A particularly violent partisan civil war erupted against the Germans and *Ustashe* Croats. Serbian monarchists and Yugoslav Communists led by Josip Tito, himself of mixed Croat and Slovene background, clashed in a bloody civil war. Centered largely in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this war cost the Yugoslavs approximately 2 million lives. The same pattern of ethnic rivalry, hatred, and violence that marked this period would resurface in the 1990's.

Following the Partisans' victory after World War II, Tito became head of state and did a remarkable job of binding together a country from individual enclaves of ethnic diversity and hate. His formula for this was to eliminate nationalism in favor of socialist unity. The map which follows on the next page depicts the Balkans as it emerged from World War I and existed through the Tito era. As shown, the country was divided into six federal republics with new internal borders: Serbia (including the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo), Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia.

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MAP 2: THE BALKANS: 1914 TO MARCH 1992

1914 to March 1992



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APPENDIX

Tito wisely did not award Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia as the Serbs wished, and as a consequence, gained the support of many Muslim Slavs living there. Shrewdly, he soothed the Serbs by seating the Yugoslav capital in Belgrade with all the attendant important jobs and prominence. Communism proved to be a strong cohesive force. Tito cleverly evoked in the country an anti-Soviet mood, used international factors to solidify the country, and established Yugoslavia as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement. For 35 years, Tito dealt quickly, and sometimes brutally, with problems as they arose.⁴ He deposed upstart Croat and Serb leaders and emplaced new ones who would play by his rules.⁵

Following Tito's death in 1980, the country gradually came apart. Ethnic nationalism, lying dormant or brutally suppressed during Tito reemerged. Resentment of centralized control and cries for regional independence grew. Economic conditions deteriorated, fears of Serbian domination grew, and finally, with the demise of the Soviet Union, a sharp rise in nationalist sentiment accelerated calls for independence in the republics. The independence movement within the Federation of Yugoslavia was preeminently tied to the desire for ethnically homogeneous "nation-states" in which the ethnic majorities would rule.⁶ Such a scheme was workable for the majority of the republics, but not for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is comprised of an ethnically diverse population. The map which follows clearly shows the important role of ethnic composition. It illustrates the homogeneity within the republics (except Bosnia), the ethnic differences between republics, and the diverse ethnic makeup of Bosnia.

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MAP 3: ETHNIC GROUPS IN EASTERN EUROPE



Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative

APPENDIX

II. THE BALKANS DEBACLE

Yugoslavia literally came apart at its ethnic (and former republic) seams in 1991 and 1992 as illustrated on the preceding map. There were numerous contributing events, factors, and causes for its demise. The foremost significant events are listed in the table on the next page. To briefly recount the key events, in May 1991, Croatian voters supported a referendum calling for their republic to become an independent nation. A bloody, six-month civil war began against the Serbian-dominated Yugoslavian Army. In December, a similar referendum and declaration took place in Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina declared their independence from Yugoslavia as well. In January 1992, largely due to the urging of Germany, the European Community recognized Croatia and Slovenia, but withheld recognition from Bosnia-Herzegovina pending a referendum on independence.⁷

The Bosnian situation was uniquely different from its fellow Balkan states. While a majority of the ethnically diverse Bosnians (over 60 per cent) desired independence, Serbs (34 per cent) uniformly opposed independence.⁸ Furthermore, the republic was bitterly divided politically and lacked a viable political apparatus to effectively govern itself. The response of the Serbs was to establish their own Assembly, refute Bosnia-Herzegovina's laws, declare themselves as "Serb Autonomous Provinces," and vote to remain in Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, the Muslims and Croats sought independence without the support of the Serbs, held a referendum (boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs) and overwhelmingly chose secession. The European community and the United States willingly recognized the legitimacy of this referendum, despite the Serbs' repeated warnings that they would go to war rather than be incorporated into the Bosnia-Herzegovina state. The world should not have been surprised when civil war erupted as promised. The Bosnian Serbs, with the help of the largely Serb Yugoslav army, took the offensive, and began the bloody war which continues to this day.⁹

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III. CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS: BALKANS DEBACLE

DATE	EVENT SUMMARY
(HISTORICAL)	
1450's	Ottoman Turks conquer Bosnia-Herzegovina, Balkans region
1876	Christian peasants and Serbia and Montenegro revolt
1878	Russia enters region, crushes Ottoman army Congress of Berlin, Bosnia-Herzegovina under Austro-Hungarian empire
1908	Austria-Hungary annexes Bosnia-Herzegovina, infuriates Serbs
1914	Bosnian Serb assassinates Austria-Hungary's Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, touches off World War I
1918-	Establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes under King Alexander
1929	Name change to Yugoslavia (due to Croatian protests), Alexander assumes dictatorial powers, Serbian oppressive dominance
1933	Croatian extremism emerges (<i>Ustashe</i> , or Uprising Movement); Macedonian terrorist assassinates King Alexander; tri-partite rule
Mar 1941	Yugoslavia votes to join Axis pact; government topples, Axis invades and conquers government; guerrilla warfare erupts and lasts through duration of War (Tito leads Communist partisans)
WW II	Croatian close ranks with Nazis, along with Bosnian Muslims, conduct "ethnic cleansing" and kill hundreds of thousands of Serbs
1945-48	Violent struggle; Tito emerges to rule non-aligned communist state
1953	Tito becomes President for Life
1974	Constitutional reform greatly decentralized federal power
May 1980	Tito dies, rotating presidency goes into effect, unrest builds
(MODERN ERA)	
1989	
May 1989	President Gorbachev named Soviet President; Demise of Soviet Union begins
Nov 1989	Berlin Wall is open to the West

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1990

- Feb 1990 Soviet Communists relinquish sole power
Aug 1990 Iraq invades Kuwait; DESERT SHIELD begins

1991

- Jan 1991 Gulf War/DESERT STORM war against Iraq begins
Apr 1991 Gulf War ends; PROVIDE COMFORT (Kurdish relief) begins
May 1991 Croatian and Slovenian referendums to become independent
Jun 1991 Croatia and Slovenia declare independence; civil war begins
Aug 1991 Gorbachev resigns; Boris Yeltsin in
Sep 1991 Yugoslavia (Serbia) moves against Croatia
Nov 1991 EC imposes sanctions against Yugoslavia
Dec 1991 Soviet Union breaks up; forms C.I.S.
Bosnia-Herzegovina applies to EC for independence

1992

- Jan 1992 UN brokered cease-fire for Slovenia and Croatia
Deployment of UN forces (UNPROFOR) (approx 14,000 troops)
Yugoslav Republic formally breaks up
Macedonia declares independence from Yugoslavia
Mar 1992 Bosnians vote and declare independence (boycotted by Serbs)
Apr 1992 Bosnian Serbs secede, declare independent Serb Republic of Bosnia
Violent war erupts in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Following the EC, US recognizes Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia
New (smaller) Yugoslavia proclaimed (Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro)
May 1992 UN (US) imposes economic sanctions on Serbia (Belgrade government)
Jul 1992 US/UN humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo begins
Aug 1992 Bosnian Serbs control 60% of former Bosnia-Herzegovina
UN approves force to guard aid for Sarajevo
Sep 1992 UN expels Yugoslavia (Serbia)
Oct 1992 UN Council establishes Bosnian "No-Fly Zone"
US deploys fighters to support Operation DENY FLIGHT
Dec 1992 "Hardliners" oust Premier Panic of Yugoslavia

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1993

- Jan 1993 London talks; Vance-Owen plan developed
President Clinton takes office
- May 1993 Vance-Owen plan rejected
US deploys 300 man team to Macedonia
- Jun 1993 U.S. reprisal strike against Iran for Bush assassination attempt
marks first use of force under President Clinton
- Jul 1993 Clinton-Christopher embark on "Lift and Bomb" initiative
Rejected by EC; "Safe-Haven" concept developed
- Oct 1993 Bosnian Serbs escalate winter siege offensives
Somalia raid disaster; 18 American soldiers die;
U.S. announces Mar 1994 withdrawal
- Nov 93 U.S. contingent turned away at Haiti

1994

- Feb 1994 Macedonia recognized by world community (U.S., West)
Sarajevo mortar massacre kills 28 Bosnian Muslims
UN ultimatum to Bosnian Serbs to move weapons from Sarajevo
Limited use of airstrikes for Sarajevo authorized
Russia enters dialogue with Serbs, deploys Peace-Keepers
US (UN) F-16s shoot down four Bosnian Serb aircraft
following no-fly zone violation and Bosnian bombing run
Sec-State Christopher policy speech articulates U.S. interests
in seeking resolution to Bosnian conflict
- Mar 1994 Washington talks produce Bosnian-Croat accords
- Apr 1994 Bosnian Serbs attack Gorazde

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IV. THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLES ARMY

When the former Yugoslavia began to break up, the army, a large, well-equipped and fairly competent force, remained intact for quite some time. As the five present day "nation states" emerged, local governments maneuvered to secure the armed forces within its borders to ensure security and survival. The preponderance of the former Yugoslavia's forces were located in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. As the civil war and breakup of Yugoslavia began, Serbian leadership, located in the Belgrade capital, was ideally positioned to secure the remnants of the central Yugoslav Republic. Serbs dominated the military leadership, possessed the majority of the material assets, the air force, and heavy weapons. Other ethnic forces largely deserted en mass. As a result, Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs have enjoyed a clear-cut military advantage throughout the conflict.¹⁰ The Bosnian Muslims were particularly short-changed during the break-up of the YPA and received no air force, little armor and heavy artillery.

VI. THE NEW BALKAN REPUBLICS

For purposes of brevity, the map which follows on page A-13 reflects the boundaries established for the new Balkans nation-states following their declarations of independence in 1991-1992. It does not reflect the probable partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Page A-14 provides a "snap-shot" summary of the principal former Yugoslavia nation-states. Finally, page A-15 and A-16 provide a synopsis of key facts, figures, and leaders of the former Yugoslav republics.

MAP 4

REPUBLICS OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Borders at Declaration of Independence (1991-1992)



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THE NEW BALKAN REPUBLICS

Slovenia. When Slovenia declared its independence, its authorities were well prepared; it was relatively free of ethnic diversity; geographically, it was far removed from the center of the Yugoslav Peoples Army's (YPA) strength and surprised the YPA with its strong resistance. More concerned with Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia virtually ceded Slovenia and concentrated on what it viewed as more vital conflicts. Slovenia is the most viable Balkan nation.

Croatia. Croatia was not nearly so well prepared; it had significant ethnic minorities, mostly Serbs, within its borders, and the federal Yugoslav government moved to stop the secession and seized control of about 30 percent of Croatia's territory. Both Slovenia and Croatia are more European than Slavic in their racial, ethnic, religious, and cultural heritage and have enjoyed diplomatic and political support from the EC. A UN cease-fire was arranged on Jan 2, 1992 and a 14,000 member UN peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR) arrived to monitor the ceasefire and protect the minority Serbs. However, the situation was never fully or formally resolved. In the summer of 1993, after the failure of the Vance-Owens initiative, Croatia resumed hostilities against Bosnia, and grabbed contested territory. Only recently, in March 1994, did Washington talks achieve a second truce. The terms of this agreement went much further and formed a limited Bosnia-Croatia confederation, making both nations far more viable.

Bosnia-Herzegovina. Within Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbs, who make up 33 percent of the population, despite assurances of wide-ranging autonomy and ethnically based cantons within the republic, reacted unfavorably to the possibility of being dominated by a Muslim (43 percent) and Croat (17 percent) majority. They organized, and with the support of Serbia, launched a vicious civil war. The central former Yugoslav authority in Belgrade essentially ceded Slovenia, made peace with Croatia, and focused its not so clandestine support to the Bosnian Serbs. The Serbs adopted a military strategy of siege warfare exploiting their advantage of heavy weapons to eliminate other ethnic groups in culturally mixed pockets. This brutal program euphemistically is referred to as "ethnic cleansing." (This tactic has not been limited to the Serbs.) The Serbs have been successful militarily and control approximately 70% of the original Bosnia-Herzegovina territory.

Serbia and Montenegro. After the withdrawal of the other Yugoslav republics from the Yugoslav federal institutions, Serbia and Montenegro agreed in April 1992 to establish a new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It inherited much of the bureaucracy and significantly, the majority of the armed forces, of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, due to its support of Bosnian Serb aggression and for a variety of other reasons, it has not been recognized by the international community. Many Serbian leaders hold as their goal a situation whereby all Serbs live under a Serbian dominated government, or better yet, a united Serbian state. Consistent with this, Serbia ceded Slovenia, where few Serbs lived, annexed areas of Croatia where Serbs lived, and most significantly, seized and are assisting Bosnian Serbs in taking large areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Except for its historically friendly ties to Russia, Yugoslavia, or Serbia, is subject to sanctions and viewed as a pariah state.

Macedonia. Like the other nations, Macedonia also requested independent status and completed its secession in March of 1992 without substantial fighting. Due to Greek objections (over the name "Macedonia" and fearful of future territorial claims on its own Greek Macedonia), this nation only recently (Feb 94) received formal EC and US diplomatic recognition. The U.S. deployed a 300 member peace-keeping team to Macedonia as a hedge to contain the conflict.¹¹

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA REPUBLICS: FACTS AND FIGURES
(Page 1 of 2)

<u>REPUBLIC</u>	<u>SLOVENIA</u>	<u>CROATIA</u>	<u>BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA</u>
SIZE	Massachu- setts	Vermont, Mass. & Conn.	Vermont, New Hampsh & Rhode Islnd
POPULATION	1.9 mil	4.8 mil	4.4 mil
ETHNIC COMPOSITION	91% Slovene 3% Croat 2% Serb	78% Croat 12% Serb 2% Yugoslav	43% Muslim 31% Serb 17% Croat
KEY LEADERS			
President:	Milan Kucan	F. Tudjman	I. Izetbegovic
Prime Mnstr:	Drnovsek	H. Sarinic	Pelivan
Other:		G. Hadzin (Serb ldr)	Karadzic (Serb ldr)
		Boban (Croat)	Panic (voted out)
ARMED FORCES			
Troops: (Army)	15,000	190,000	50,000 Muslim 35,000 Croat (vs) 35,000 Serbs
Tanks:	100	350 (?)	Muslims: Very Few Croats: Few Serbs: 50 to hundreds
Air Force	None	A Handful	20-26 Serb Fixed Wg @ 50 Serb Helo

SOURCE: Steven J. Woehrel, Yugoslavia: Facts and Figures on the Former Republics and Western Response, A Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, The Library of Congress, February 1, 1993.

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA REPUBLICS: FACTS AND FIGURES
(Page 2 of 2)

REPUBLIC	SERBIA	MONTENEGRO	MACEDONIA
SIZE (approx.)	Indiana	Connecticut	Maryland
POPULATION	9.8 mil	615,000	2.0 mil
ETHNIC COMPOSITION	66% Serb 17% Albanian 3% Hungarian 2% Muslim	62% Montenegrin 14% Muslim 9% Serb 4% Yugoslav	64% Macedonian 21% Albanian 5% Turk 2% Serb
KEY LEADERS			
President:	Milosevic	Bulatovic	Gligorov
Prime Mnstr:	Bozovic	Djukanovic	Crvenkovski
Other:	Cosic (Yugosl. Pres.)		
ARMED FORCES			
Troops: (Army)	169,000 plus 510,000 reserves	Under Serbia	20,000 plus
Tanks:	1,850 1,000 artillery 6,000 mortars	None	None
Air Force	500 fixed wing 165 helo	None	None

SOURCE: Steven J. Woehrel, Yugoslavia: Facts and Figures on the Former Republics and Western Response, A Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, The Library of Congress, February 1, 1993.

VIII. The Vance-Owen Plan

As a result of many months of UN and EC sponsored negotiations among the Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslims, Serbs and Croats, Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen, joined by representatives from all warring parties, led an effort which produced an interesting approach to resolve the conflict.

Following the London Conference, in August of 1982, the conference members agreed upon a number of positions (although these were widely ignored and never implemented). These included:¹²

- o Non-recognition of all advantages gained by force
- o Total condemnation of forced expulsions ... and attempts to change the ethnic composition of populations
- o Rejection of all efforts to acquire territory and change borders by force

A significant portion of the Vance-Owen Plan was the constitutional framework it provided, designed to form a workable government agreeable to all parties. A curious aspect of the plan called for Bosnia to be divided into 10 largely autonomous provinces (called Cantons) led by a weak central (Moslem dominant) government. National defense was dropped as a sovereign responsibility and would be the responsibility of international authorities.¹³ The key problem with Vance-Owen lay with the unusual map of the provinces. They were delineated by no obvious criteria other than ethnicity. The Croat provinces would be ripe for annexation by Croatia, while the Serb and Muslim provinces were so intermingled as to be unworkable.¹⁴ The US, under the Bush Administration, did not fully or formally support the plan, despite the EC's urging. A plan acceptable to all parties was never agreed upon, and the Bosnian problem would be transferred to the new Administration. To its credit, Vance-Owen provided useful dialogue and made progress in working towards political solutions to many problems.

ENDNOTES FOR THE APPENDIX

(1)The historical discussion which follows is derived from a variety of sources. Virtually all texts are remarkably consistent. Those viewpoint on historical data. Those viewpoints that are unique are specifically cited by endnotes in this text.

(2)Derived from multiple sources. For an excellent summary, refer to Steven J. Woehrel's, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Background to the Conflict, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, Jan 21, 1993.

(3)John Zametica, The Yugoslav Conflict, London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992, pp 3-11.

(4)Tito's success in holding together the Yugoslav Republic has been attributed to his acting as "an equal opportunity oppressor" (provided by an anonymous State Department source).

(5)Walter Roberts, "The Balkan Debacle Could Have Been Averted," Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, Apr-May 1993, pp 6-7.

(6)Robert M. Hayden, "The Bosnian Debacle," A Report for The National Council for Soviet and East European Research, Washington, D.C., 8 Nov 93, p. 1.

(7)Both Slovenia and Croatia received considerable support from a recently reunited, Germany, which under the leadership of Hans Dietrich Genscher, practically used the Balkan crisis as a test demonstration of its new leadership role in the Post Cold War era.

(8)Hayden, p. 3. The Hayden article provides a highly detailed account of the political dimension of the Bosnian debacle. Hayden is extremely critical of the EC and American policy of recognizing such a non-viable republic.

(9)IBID, pp. 2-8.

(10)The Former Yugoslavia: DIA Handbook (U), Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., April 1993.

(11)Steven J. Woehrel, Yugoslavia: Facts and Figures On the Former Republics and Western Response, A Congression Research Service Report for Congress, Library of Congress, Feb 1, 1993, p. 7.

(12)Robert M. Hayden, "The Bosnian Debacle," A Report for the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, Washington, D.C., 8 Nov 93, p. 3.

(13)Steven J. Woehrel, "Bosnia-Herzegovina Negotiations: The Vance-Owen Plan," A CRS Report for Congress, Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, April 14, 1993, p. 7.

(14)Hayden, pp. 11-13.